Nuclear weapon proliferation is of major concern to the international community. Thus observers are of the opinion that nuclear proliferation is likely to be one of the most important issues facing the world today and it is also likely going to be one issue to face the world for many years to come. Besides, terrorism, nuclear proliferation is probably the single biggest political issue in the world today [1]. 

Many authors have, right from the beginning advocated against the use and spread of nuclear weapons. Former United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered a speech title “Atoms for Peace” to the United National General Assembly in New York City on December 8, 1953. In his speech he said, “I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new, one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of atomic warfare” [2]. Eisenhower used his speech to argue against the development of nuclear weapons and also to form an international forum whereby the need for the establishment of an agency whose job it is in preventing other countries from developing and spreading nuclear weapons would be resolved. His ideas would later form the basis of the origin of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Atoms for peace programme embodies the vision that has driven the IAEA since its inception. Mohammed El Baradei, the Director General of the Agency in one of his articles published by the IAEA’s Division of Public Information, says that the ‘Atoms for Peace’ ideal remains appropriate and vital, the unifying principle behind the IAEA’s dual mission [3].

On the work of the IAEA regarding nuclear verification, El Baradei sees the IAEA as a ‘watchdog’. The Agency, in its role of verifying nuclear non-proliferation, has been much in the public view, often referred to as “The World’s nuclear watchdog”. He also says that “given the increasing threat of proliferation both by states and by terrorists, one idea that may now be worth serious consideration is the advisability of limiting the processing of weapons usable material in civilian nuclear programmes” [4]. EL Baradei observed that the most dramatic outcome has been the clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability by a number of countries, coupled with what has been the emergence of a ‘nuclear supermarket’ – an illicit network of trade in sensitive nuclear equipment and designs. He says further that “the linkage between non-proliferation and disarmament should be obvious by now. As long as some countries continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security, others will be inclined to emulate them” [5]. The IAEA should be strengthened as it plays a central role in verifying that nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes.

On the security context of nuclear non-proliferation, EL Baradei opines that the search for security remains the overriding concern for many people and nations. But the definition of what constitutes security and the strategies for attaining it, vary greatly amongst people and also between more dangerous and complex. Therefore, there’s the need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Against this backdrop, EL Baradei sees four critical areas or aspects of non-proliferation regime that must be strengthened. These are:

Firstly, the development of a more effective approach for dealing with proliferation threats; secondly securing existing nuclear materials stockpiles and tighten controls over transfers and production of nuclear material; thirdly, strengthening the verification authority and capacity of the IAEA and fourthly, the need to find a way for disarmament to be given the prominence and priority it deserves [6].

David B. Walter in his article entitled ‘Managing the nuclear dilemma sees nuclear technology as a dilemma which countries are faced with. To him, the pressing issue is how to further develop and promote peaceful application of nuclear technology while at the same time prevent the spread of weapons technology. This is the current nuclear enterprise [7].

Fischer, in his article on “Nuclear Safeguards Evolution and the future”, provides an insightful overview of international nuclear safeguards. In it, he focused on the steps to strengthen the global nuclear verification regime. To him, safeguards aim to verify that nuclear material and technology are only used for peaceful purposes [8].

The pater is divided into four parts. The first part is introduction. The second section deals with the theoretical framework on which the work stands and draws it analysis. This is followed by the analysis of the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) towards nuclear non-proliferation. In this section the work examined the dualism in the activities of the IAEA which is nuclear inspections and verification (safeguards system) and peaceful technical nuclear co-operation. The argument tends to suggest that the IAEA activities towards nuclear proliferation is not only on inspecting nuclear facility, thus, preventing military purposes but also involved in humanitarian work. This it does together with its main function of ensuring and preventing countries from proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials. 

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical conception of this work is based on the system theory. System theory basically is a theory in which the world or international community is seen as a system. According to Joshua Goldstein, one of the proponents of this theory views the world as an international system based on a set of relationships among the world’s states, structured according to certain rules and patterns of interactions. Some of such rules are explicit, some implicit. They include who is a member of the system, what rights and responsibilities the members have and what kind of actions and responses normally occur between states [9]. Going by this view of the world as an international system, then theoretically, this system is divided into sub-system. Each sub-system makes up the complete international system. These subsystems are represented by actors, in this case nation state actors while an international organization, in this case International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) represents the main system.

In system theory, any problem or defect in the sub-system affects the rest of the system as a whole. The nation state actors are members of the IAEA and have decided collectively to abide by its statute in order to protect global security. Going by this analogy of the IAEA being the system or the representatives of their own individual or regional systems, therefore, any problem or potential problem within the various sub-systems would inadvertently affect the general system. The IAEA is an international organization made of states that are member of it. The IAEA of the representative of the international system tries to forestall any problem or breakdown of global security by preventing states, both members and non-members states of the IAEA from proliferating nuclear weapon, then it becomes a problem which will affect the international security (in this case the IAEA) as it would lead to political and military tensions which ultimately, would lead to a breakdown of global peace and security. The IAEA thus tries to uphold the values of the international system through its functions. It also tries to uphold peace and security in the international system. 

The Activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Towards Nuclear Non- Proliferation

Nuclear Inspections and Verification (Safeguards System): The IAEA carries out its main functions of preventing nuclear proliferation by inspecting nuclear facilities and verifying that what goes on in such facilities are solely for peaceful purpose and is not diverted to the military for military purpose. This is called the safeguards system. The IAEA administers its safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honouring their commitments not to develop or proliferate nuclear weapons.

The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks for inventories and samples and analyses materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection [10]. The safeguards systems of the IAEA is also complimented by control on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as the United Kingdom (the UK) and the United States of America (the USA) through voluntary bodies such as the nuclear suppliers group or NSG. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium should not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil nuclear plants and that plutonium, which is produced by nuclear reactors as a by-product, not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production [11].

Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.

Countries that are parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty or NPT, agree to accept technical safeguards measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transaction involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspections and their records and the nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are being complemented by other measures such as the use of surveillance and instrumentation [12].

The safeguards system is based on the assessment of the correctness and completeness of a state’s declarations to the IAEA concerning nuclear material and nuclear related activities. To date, 145 states have entered into such agreements with the IAEA, submitting nuclear materials, facilities and activities to the scrutiny of IAEA’s safeguards inspectors [13]. IAEA verification helps provide assurance that such items are not diverted or misused in order to assemble nuclear weapons and that no items required to be declared under safeguards are undeclared. This, in turn, helps to allay security concerns among states with respect to the development of nuclear weapons.

The inspections which the IAEA carries out, acts as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. Basically, the system relies on: 

• Material Accountancy: Tracking all inward and outward transfers and flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections and review and verification of operation records

• Physical Security: Restricting access to nuclear materials at the sites

• Containment and Surveillance: Use of seals, automated camera and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as on the spot checks on site

All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records.

In 1993, a programme was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system and a model protocol called the Additional Protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997 [14]. The measure boosted the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle. The innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of the IAEA’s existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through the additional protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with the IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement.

Under an additional protocol which is the key to the strengthened safeguards system, a state is required to provide the IAEA with broader information covering all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle-related activities, including research and development and uranium mining. States must also grant the agency broader access rights and enable it to use the most advanced verification technologies. Specific measures provided for in the additional protocol include:

• Information about and access to, all aspects of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mines to nuclear waste and any other locations where nuclear material intended for non-nuclear uses is present

• Short notice inspector access to all buildings on a nuclear site

• Information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear related technologies and inspections mechanism for manufacturing and import locations

• Access to other nuclear-related locations

• Collection of environmental samples beyond declared locations when deemed necessary by the IAEA

• States must streamline visa renewals and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters [15] 

As at January 2007, a total of 112 countries had ratified the additional protocol of these, 78 brought it into force.

Other measures aimed at ensuring nuclear non-proliferation include the Zangger Committee which was set up in 1979. It communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in that year. These were to ensure that transfer of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities and formal government assurance to this effect were required from recipients [16]. The guidelines also recognized the need for physical protection measure in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons–usable materials and strengthened transfer provisions.

Peaceful Technical Nuclear Co-operation

The IAEA is also involved in humanitarian work. This it does together with its main function of ensuring and preventing countries from proliferation nuclear weapons and materials. The IAEA carries out research into the beneficial aspects of radiation and radioisotopes in order to help communities and countries solve pressing social infrastructural issues.

The IAEA’s technical humanitarian work covers four areas of human endeavour and these areas are energy, health and medicine, agriculture and food productivity and industry. Its work on these areas is peaceful and it promotes such peaceful technical co-operation among countries of the world including both members and non-members of the IAEA alike.

Energy

In energy, the IAEA helps its member state to build capacity in managing the development of their energy sector. The goal here is not to promote nuclear power; in fact, in many cases, nuclear power is not the preferred option. Rather, the IAEA seeks to promote the sustainable use of natural resources and to increase access to affordable energy services. The IAEA does this through its energy assessment services. Through these services, the IAEA develops energy planning models, tailored to each country’s special circumstances. The agency also trains local experts to forcast energy demand to identify least cost options and to bring these and other factors together into national decision making process. IAEA energy planning tools are now used in more than 100 countries around the world today [17].

But advanced science and technology must also be guarded against misuse. In the nuclear arena, there are a number of aspects which the IAEA tries to strengthen, especially on issues bordering on nuclear security. Om nuclear security, the IAEA tries to prioritise the issue of trying to stem the illicit trade in nuclear and radiological materials. This means finishing the effort to secure facilities at risk, where such materials are used or stored. It also aims at encouraging countries to improve the ability of their police force and border guards to detect smuggling efforts. It also aims at limiting the use of nuclear energy in the civilian sector to low enriched uranium fuel, which cannot readily be used in weapons. 

Agriculture and Food Production

In agriculture, the IAEA’s main emphasis is on adequate food production, food security and pest control. Food security is among the most challenging problems facing poor countries. Boosting agricultural production requires enhanced crop varieties, effective pest control measures, increased soil fertility and better soil and water management. Under national and regional projects, the IAEA helps local scientists and farmers with beneficial nuclear techniques that support each of the above listed goals. The idea is not only to boost food production, but also to sustain it while preserving the environment. Radioisotopes are used in agriculture mostly for irradiating food and for destroying pests that eat up and destroy food crops. It is also used for improving the yields of certain varieties of crops. Very high dosage of radiation can provide completely sterile food products, while low dosage of radiation can prolong the shelf life of perishable foods.

Health and Medicine

In medicine, radiation and radioisotopes are used for diagnosis and treatment of disease such as cancer. This method of medical treatment is known as radiotherapy. The IAEA supports research in cancer treatment especially in the use of radioisotopes to treat cancer. It supports many cancer research institutions as well as provides the radioisotopes to the various cancer research institutions around the world. The IAEA is actively engaged in funding laboratories that carry out research on cancers as well as treating such cancers.

For several years now, the IAEA has been promoting the use of nuclear techniques to combat hunger and malnutrition. As part of this initiative, the IAEA, through the IAEA Nobel Cancer and Nutrition Fund has been particularly dedicated to building capacity in the use of nuclear techniques to develop and evaluate interventions that can contribute to improved nutrition and health for children [18]. In particular, countries are gaining technical expertise in the use of stable isotope techniques in the development and evaluation of material interventions. Stable (i.e. non-radioactive) isotope techniques have been used as research tools in nutrition for mant years. However, the application of these techniques in nutrition programme development and evaluation is a relatively new approach, one where the IAEA has a great opportunity to contribute. 

Industry

Finally, in industry, the IAEA in collaboration with member states supports the use of radioisotope for industrial purposes. In industry, radiation and radioisotopes are used for various purposes ranging from detecting leaks in galvanized pipes, to evaluating and detecting wears on automobile tires. Isotope hydrology has emerged as a key contribution to the effective management of groundwater and other water resources. Also in industry, isotope tracers are being used effectively to improve the management of geothermal fields used in power generation [19]. These are some of the areas where the IAEA promote cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear techniques to meet human needs. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has so far, been able to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons proliferation. Through its safeguards and verification programme, a lot of countries have abandoned the quest to acquire nuclear weapons. Many countries have instead opted to use nuclear power to generate electricity and for carrying out research on medical, agricultural and industrial uses [20]. 

The IAEA will continue to fulfil its mandate of providing credible assurance to the international community that states are honouring their non-proliferation under takings, on the basis of the legal authority imparted through IAEA safeguard agreements and additional protocols. The effectiveness and efficiency of the strengthened safeguards system will surely continue to be put to the test, as the IAEA meets new verification challenges in the coming years [21]. 

The IAEA and its efforts at nuclear non-proliferation need to be better supported and equipped to face the arduous challenge of keeping the world safe from nuclear weapons. Through mutual cooperation and dialogue, the IAEA would be in a better position to encourage countries to resist the temptation of making nuclear weapons in order to ensure global peace and security.

The IAEA could do better and achieve better results, if it is given the right kind of support and cooperation. Countries on their own or collectively with other countries can fight nuclear weapons proliferation outside of the IAEA. It is recommended that countries too can prevent nuclear weapons proliferation if they work collectively on their own and not necessarily have to wait for the IAEA. September 11 has given a new sense of urgency to a danger that the world has been concerned about for some time and in that sense it provides an opportunity. The scope of these attacks has underlined the need for countries and the IAEA to take vigorous action now to end the possibility that terrorist group or rogue states could launch even more devastating attacks in the future [22].

In conclusion, the IAEA and its efforts at nuclear non-proliferation need to be better supported and equipped to face the arduous challenge of keeping the world safe from nuclear weapons. Through mutual co-operation and dialogue, the IAEA would be in a better position to encourage countries to resist the temptation of making nuclear weapons in order to ensure global peace and security.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles is an urgent and profound threat to the security of all state and it requires urgent action. For this the following are recommended: 

• All states should elevate security against nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation to an overarching imperative that trumps other, secondary considerations [23]

• States should increase the effectiveness of their export control systems and assist other states in the same end

• Research into the peaceful application of nuclear energy in the fields of medicine and agriculture should continue. Also, less developed countries of the world should be allowed to benefit from this

• Countries being investigated for alleged NPT violations should be barred from holding positions of influence in the IAEA

• Finally, countries which possess nuclear weapons like the US, Russia etc, should disarm, stop, gun-boat stratagem and engage in disarmament negotiations to ensure co-operation, equity as well as security 

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