This paper intends to examine Asabiyyah as a major threat to the unity and peaceful coexistence of the diverse Muslim groups since the early years of Islam. During the period of the Prophet (SAW), trails of Asabiyyah prejudices such as tribal pride, ethnic feuds and vengeance killings inherited from the pre-Islamic times were put to rest through his noble teachings. (Examples of this noble teachings include (1): where he condemns Asabiyyah by saying:-  “He is not of us who proclaims the cause of tribal partisanship, and he is not of us who fights in the cause of tribal partisanship, and he is not of us who dies in the cause of tribal partisanship” (M.M. Khan, Sahih al-Bukhari-Arabic –English, vol. 4, Dar al-Fikr, p472) (2): His reaction to the tribes of Aws and Khazraj when news of their intention to return back to their old tribal custom of Asabiyyah prejudice  reached him after he succeeded in uniting them. He rebuked them saying: - “O Muslims! Remember Allah! Remember Allah! Will you act as pagans while I am present with you after Allah has guided you to Islam, and honored you thereby and made a clean break with paganism, delivered you thereby from disbelief; and made you friends thereby? When the Aws and the Khazraj heard this they wept, and embraced each other. (Al-Tabari, M. J. (1420/2000), Jami’ Al-Bayan An Ta’wil Ay al-Qur’an. Edited by A. M. Shakir, Mu’assasat

Al-Risalah, 1^st ed. Vol.6, (Qur'an, 3:99), p56)). However, after his death, instances of Asabiyyah started to manifest again even before his burial. Political partisanship grew intense especially after the murder of the third Caliph, Uthman bin Affan (RA). The situations further worsen when the Muslim state disintegrated into independent nations during the Ottoman Empire. The paper shall therefore give a glimpse of the re-emergence of the acts of Asabiyyah prejudice within this period before citing examples of its spread to the Muslim World and the damage it has caused to their unity and peaceful co-existence.

Asabiyyah in the Classical Period 

After the death of the Prophet (SAW), the Muslims were left with the problem of succession, as he did not mention who to succeed him on his death. The Ansar therefore, gathered immediately in a big hall in Madinah known as Saqifah Bani Sa’idah to discuss the appointment of a Khalifah. Some of the leading Ansar wanted a Khalifah from amongst them. Informed about the gathering of Ansar, Abubakr (RA) and Umar (RA) also went there accompanied by a number of eminent Muhajirun like Abu Ubaidah bin Al-Jarrah. There was a hot talk between the Mahajirun and the Ansar pertaining to the appointment of the first Khalifah. In the course of this debate, one Ansari, named Khabab Bin Mundhar stood up and said: 

Let there be two Amirs (Khalifas) then, one from amongst Quraysh and another from amongst Ansar. Hearing this, Umar stood up and said: This is not at all possible. There would be great confusion because of two Amirs. Further discussion continued between them but at last the Ansar agreed to have the Khalifah from the Muhajirun and promised to remain helpers as they did during the Prophet’s life [1].

Political and sectarian differences led to great civil wars and battles between the Muslims especially after the assassination of Uthman (RA), the third Caliph. His assassination revived the old tribal prejudice of the Arabs which had vanished as a result of the teachings of the Prophet (SAW). The unfortunate incident tempered with the unity of the Muslims [2]. The Umayyads and the Hashemites were sharply divided into two rival and hostile camps. It wa alleged that Muawiyah (RA), the Umayyad chief, exploited the situation created by the murder of Uthman (RA) to win the support of the association of the Umayyad families who were in thousands to fight against Khalifah Ali (RA). This resulted in the assassination of Ali (RA). It also led to the persecution of the Hashemites under the Umayyad’s dynasty. The civil wars similarly introduced bitterness between the Madinat Ansars and the Makkan Umayyads.  Later, internal strife between the Hejaz-Arabs and Yemen-Arabs also erupted. This occurred mostly during the reign of Yazid II Bin Abdul Malik. He embarked on the policy of favoring the Hejaz-Arabs and oppressing the Yemen-Arabs. The Yemen-Arabs therefore fell in the bad grace of the Khalifah [3].  The old tribal partisanship of the Arabs was therefore revived during the Umayyad period. 

When the Abbasids came to power, they also adopted the policy of exterminating the Umayyads right from the beginning of their reign. Abul Abbas As-Saffah, the first Khalifah of the Abbasids killed a large number of the Umayyads in cold blood in retaliation for the murder of his brother Ibrahim. AbdurRahman, a grandson of Hisham however, managed to escape the terrible vengeance of the Abbasids. He ran to Spain and established a new Umayyad dynasty there. With this development of founding a separate kingdom, the unity of the Islamic Khilafah was lost.  Another group considered as political opponents by Abul Abbas As-Saffah was the Alids. Indeed, the Alids remained discontented with the Abbasids because they deceived and deprived them from the Khilafah. Being aware of this claim, the Abbasids embarked on the policy of repression against the Alids. Abu Ja’far Al-Mansur especially was the first who occasioned dissensions between the Abbasids and the members of Ali (RA)’s family.   Thus, political partisanship among close relations was one of the defects of the Abbasid periods. It is therefore important to note that Asabiyyah prejudices were the major causes of the downfall of the Abbasid Khilafah. These prejudices include: racial enmity between the Arabs and non-Arabs, Persians, Turks, and Berbers. The Arabs thought that they exclusively have the right to the Khilafah and as such they were jealous of the rise of Persians in the Abbasid leadership. The Arabs and Persians were equally jealous of the supremacy of the Turks in the later period of the Abbasids. Even the Arabs as mentioned earlier split into two rival camps; the Hijaz Arabs and the Yaman-Arabs. Their rivalry and conflict greatly contributed to the weakness and disintegration of the Abbasid Khilafah. 

Another phenomenon which further caused the disintegration of the Islamic Khilafah was sectarian differences which primarily grew intense after the period of the Companions. Religio-political sects such as the Shiites, Kharijites and Mu’tazilites created confusion in the Khilafah and added to the process of disintegration. In order to justify their views, the sectarians narrated many traditions from the Prophet (SAW), which were not accepted by the general community of Muslims. Some people such as the Zanadiqah (singl. Zindiq- atheist) [4] attributed false traditions to the Prophet (SAW) for the purpose of down casting and dishonoring the faith. Some illiterate persons narrated spurious traditions thinking it a good religious act. The followers of prejudicial and group feelings narrated traditions to fortify sectarian views. Examples of such spurious traditions are:

The following false statement of Zanadiqah in attributing a partner to Allah in matters of creation

الله خالق النور والناس والدواب والأنعام، وإبليس خالق الظلمة والسباع والحيات والعقارب.

(Meaning): Allah is the Creator of light, mankind, animals and livestock; while Satan is the creator of darkness, beasts, snakes and scorpions [5].

In condemnation and response to the above sacrilegious statement, Allah says:

وَجَعَلُوا لِلَّهِ شُرَكَاءَ الْجِنَّ وَخَلَقَهُمْ

(Meaning): Yet they make the Jinns equals with Allah, though Allah did create the Jinns)

The Zanadiqah, prejudicially and falsely added certain statements in the following Hadith in order to create doubts and confusion in the minds of the Muslims:

أنا خاتم الأنبياء لا نبي بعدي إلا ما شاء الله

I am the seal of all Prophets, so there is no Prophet after me, except what Allah so wish [6].

The above-mentioned statement: except what Allah so wish was added in order to open room for the Muslims to accept the possibility of having another prophet after Muhammad (SAW). The correct saying of the Prophet (SAW) however is:

أنا خاتم النبيين لا نبي بعدى 

I am the seal of all Prophets, so there is no Prophet after me [7]

The following spurious traditions narrated by Abdullah Bin Saba' [8] in order to lay the foundation of unbelief ideology against the religion of Islam:

العجب ممن يزعم أن عيسى يرجع ويكذب بأن محمدا يرجع وقد قال الله عز وجل: "إِنَّ الَّذِي فَرَضَ عَلَيْكَ الْقُرْآنَ لَرَادُّكَ إِلَى مَعَادٍ"   فمحمد أحق بالرجوع من عيسى

(Meaning): It is very surprising for those who assert that Isa (AS) will come back but falsify the coming back of Muhammad (SAW) in spite of the fact that Allah says: "Verily He Who ordained the Quran for thee, will bring thee back to the Place of Return". Therefore, Muhammad (SAW) has more right to come back than Isa (AS) [9].

With that false statement, Abdullah Bin Saba' set the foundation of the return of the Shiite Imams after their death. The concept of wasiyyah was also institutionalized by him. He said:

أنه كان ألف نبي ولكل نبي وصي. وكان علي وصي محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم فمحمد خاتم الأنبياء وعلي خاتم الأوصياء

There were one thousand Prophets and every Prophet had a successor (wasiyy). Ali was the successor of Muhammad (SAW). Thus, Muhammad was the seal of all Prophets, and Ali was the seal of all successors. 

The concept of wasiyyah established by Ibn Saba' formed one of the fundamental bases of disunity and Asabiyyah bigotry between the Sunnis and the Shiites regarding the issue of Khilafah.

Disputes over Leadership also Resulted in the Fabrication of Many Traditions

The Sunnis and the Shiites have different sets of Hadith collections. The two collections differ as to the reliability of the narrators and transmitters. Narrators, who took side with Abu Bakr and Umar rather than Ali (May Allah be pleased with all of them) in the disputes over leadership that followed the death of Muhammad (SAW), are seen as unreliable by the Shiites. Narrations sourced to Ali and the family of Muhammad (SAW), and to their supporters, are preferred. Sunni scholars put trust in narrators, such as Aisha (RA), whom Shiites reject. Differences in Hadith collections have contributed to differences in worship practices and Shari'ah law and have added to the prevalence of Asabiyyah prejudices between the two groups. These misguided views coupled with the differences between the Sunnis and the Shiites became dangerous not only to the Islamic beliefs and practices, but to the unity and integration of the Muslim Ummah as a whole. 

After the downfall of the Abbasid Khilafah, the Ottomans took over the Islamic leadership. Starting in the thirteenth century, from 1288 C.E. until 1924, the Ottomans who were named after their leader Uthman, had a very vast empire. Bosnia, Tartars, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Albania were all under the empire. Disintegration of the empire however, started by the middle of the seventeenth century [10]. The vastness of the empire coupled with poor rule under less capable Sultans, were major causes for the disintegration. Provincial chaos overtook the Ottoman bureaucracy. Turkey was finished as an empire and broke up into a series of nation states. The disintegration of the Ottoman Khilafat virtually led to the rise of nationalism in the Middle East and other Muslim countries. Nationalism was a new plot hatched by the imperialism of the cross to deal Islam a blow. The aim was to realize that dream which could not be realized in the wars of crusades. To achieve this aim, they influenced some Muslim leaders to do the job for them. Mustafa Kamal Ataturk was one of such leaders influenced by the West. Through the use of nationalism, Ataturk damaged many symbols of faith in Turkey which included the following:

• He banned all Muslim-style garbs (or some of it)

• He ordered for the congregational prayers to be offered in Turkish language and not Arabic

• He strongly discouraged the hijab (veil) for women.
  Instead, they were encouraged to wear western apparel

• From 1926, the Islamic calendar was replaced with the Gregorian calendar

• Atatürk's damage to Islamic symbols also included extensive removal of Arabic and Persian words from the Turkish language. In 1928 He decreed that the Arabic script be replaced by a modified Latin alphabet

• He also lifted the Islamic ban on alcoholic beverages. He had an appreciation for the national liquor, rakı, and consumed vast quantities of it

On 3 March 1924, Atatürk established a western-style separation of church and state ("mosque" and state) in Turkey. By this, he ended the Islamic caliphate and created a secular state [11]

Through the banner of nationalism therefore, the imperialists used Ataturk and others to break up the unity and solidarity of the world Islamic Ummah which endangers imperialistic interests, and which is a potential threat to colonization in international politics. They similarly succeeded in convincing different ethnic groups to rise and fight for their independent group identities. With this progressive spread of nationalism therefore, imperialism was able to divide the Islamic world into small pieces, and swallow them one after the other [12]. In other words, nationalism, which is one of the different forms of Asabiyyah that covers all parts of the Muslim world, helped in no small measure in the fragmentation of the Muslim world into different nation states.

Instances of Asabiyyah in the Muslim World

From the above brief analysis, it becomes obvious that Asabiyyah as a result of ethnic feuds, tribal pride, religious and economic differences had been in existence since the early days of Islam especially after the death of the Prophet (SAW). It is therefore important to realize that conflicts between Muslims as a result of different types of Asabiyyah prejudices have spread to all Muslim nations since the disintegration of the Ottoman Khilafah. Many Muslim countries today, are adversely affected with such types of intractable conflicts. Examples of such countries around the Muslim world include, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, Palestine, Pakistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, just to mention but a few. To show the instances of such global phenomenon, four out of these countries mentioned above shall be briefly examined within the period between 1980 and 2007. 

Instances of Asabiyyah in Afghanistan

 The first example to be examined is Afghanistan. The agony in that country did not end with the retreat of the Soviet forces that coincided with the winding down of the cold war in 1990. Subsequently, fighting continued among the various Afghan groups, which has been no less destructive than the Soviet military intervention.  The structure and dynamics of the new phase of conflict are different and present greater difficulties in resolving the conflict than ever before. Many of these dynamics have their roots in the political, ideological and ethnic polarization that the Soviet war has caused. With each successive year, the Afghan civil war has grown more complex and also accumulated all the elements of a deadly mix-ethnicity, sectarianism, religious extremism and external intervention [13]. During the battle with the Russians, many outsiders came to the aid of the Afghans. The most numerous were Arabs led by very religious Saudi Arabians who arrived to join the Jihad.  When the Russians left, many of the Arab volunteers stayed with the millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistani camps.  Other volunteers also continued to arrive. This is where Afghans began to call the foreign volunteers, “the Arabs” [14]. Addressing the foreign volunteers as “the Arabs” is a kind of tribalistic statements usually made by those who regard themselves as indigenes against those they address as settlers. After the withdrawal of the Russians, the conditions in Afghanistan became chaotic. The fighting went on and on between the various Afghan factions. This was because no faction or group was ready to accept the leadership of another no matter how good it was. The factions could only gang up to fight against any group they find trying to have the upper hand. This was one of the reasons why the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks formed an alliance to fight against the largest ethnic group, the Pushtun [15]. 

Similarly, in spite of the tremendous respect traditionally enjoyed by the Taliban among the devout Muslim Afghans, some of the Afghan groups especially the non-Pushtun tribes in the North resisted their leadership. This resistance however was based on Asabiyyah prejudice, i.e., sectarian dichotomy. The tribes being Shiites accuse the Taliban of opposing the Shiites ideology and enforcing the Wahhabi harsh form of Islam. Their hatred to the conservative Wahhabi views resulted in their fight against the Taliban to the extent of supporting American forces to overthrow them (the Taliban) in spite of the fact that the Taliban, with the support of a wealthy man from Saudi Arabia, Usama Bin Laden, brought a degree of law and order which the people of Afghanistan have not seen since the late 1970s. The attitude of not accepting the leadership of a particular group of people because of ethnic, sectarian or political differences to the extent of helping the unbelievers to wage war against them is an act of Asabiyyah prejudice that is condemned by the religion of Islam.

Instances of Asabiyyah in Sudan

The ethnic crisis in Sudan is the second example examined by this paper. The crisis especially in the Darfur region has many interwoven causes. The lines of conflict in the region are seen to be ethnic and tribal, rather than religious [16]. Over population is also another cause of the Darfur crises. In the late 1980, landless and increasingly desperate Arabs began banding together to wrest their own Dar from the black farmers. In 1987 they published a manifesto of racial superiority, and clashes broke out between Arabs and Fur [17]. One side of the armed conflict in Darfur is composed mainly of the Sudanese military and the Janjaweed; a militia group recruited mostly from the Arab Baggara tribes of the Northern Rizeigat, Camel-herding nomads. This militia groups (Janjaweed) in military uniforms mounted on camels and horses, laid waist to the region. In a campaign of ethnic cleansing targeting Darfur blacks, the armed militiamen raped women, burned houses, and tortured and killed men of fighting age [18]. The other side comprises a variety of rebel  groups, notably the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, recruited, primarily from the land tilling non-Arabs Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit ethnic groups [19]. The Janjaweed forces mentioned earlier were armed by Khartoum’s security in 1994-2000, when they were faced with threats of insurgencies in Western and Northern Darfur. In February 2003, the insurgency escalated and this forced the government of Sudan to respond by using the Janjaweed as its main counter insurgency force.  Instructing the forces to attack and recover the rebel held areas of Darfur, Janjaweed conducted a scorched earth campaign of mass atrocity targeting civilians in the region of Darfur [20].

It is however unfortunate to mention that the various tribes that have been the object of attacks and killings do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic group to which persons or militias that attack them belong. They speak the same language (Arabic) and embrace the same religion (Islam) [21].  Among the tribes living in Darfur, the Fur, are the largest tribes numbering about 0.5million in 1983. They are a black African people who practice sedentary herding, relying mainly on the cultivation of millet. Their society is highly traditional governed by village elders.  They speak Fur, a Nilo-Saharan language and are Muslims, having adopted the religion following the region’s conquest by the Kanem Borno Empire during the middle ages.  They are Sunni Muslims following the Maliki School of Islamic law. Their Islam however, is very much mixed with their African traditions and customs. For many Furs, African traditions are more important than the Islamic instructions. In other words, they are so proud of their African identity, the main reason behind their opposition to all governments that have been ruling Sudan since 1956 and led by central and northern Sudan Arab elites. Almost all new Fur intellectuals are secular and tend to support the idea of New Sudan that was created by John Garang De Mabiour, the founder of the Sudan people’s Liberation Movement/Army [22].

Political power struggle is also one of the major causes of the Sudan crises. Until 1916, the Furs were ruled by an independent sultanate and were oriented politically to peoples in Chad. However, the British conquered Darfur in 1916, since then it has been part of Sudan. Since the 1970s the Darfur area has suffered some of the effects of the northern Arab war prosecuted in the south against southern tribes who wanted to secede from the Sudan. Similarly, the ruling class in Sudan has been accused of using race and religion to manipulate, divide, exploit and oppress the impoverished masses in order to protect their ill-gotten privilege, and as a means of holding on to power [23].

The above brief analysis of the Sudan crisis showed that the crisis contained among other things, ethnic, tribal, regional, economic and political power struggles. The analysis also showed that most of the persons involved in these partisan crises are Muslims. This no doubt has adverse effects on the Muslim Community. In fact, ethnic-regional conflicts tend to emerge at moments when groups perceive that they are being excluded from access to what they consider to be their right, be they linguistic, political, economic, administrative, commercial and religious, etc. One other factor fueling communal violence has been the emergence of increasingly militant groups [24]. This is what is happening in Sudan especially in the Darfur region.

Instances of Asabiyyah in Iraq

Iraq, which has now been consumed by violence that has pitted Shiite Muslims against Sunni Muslims, is the third example analyzed by this paper. Even though some people see the battle between Shiites and Sunnis as religious, dating to the early period of Islam when the Companions differed over who would succeed the Prophet Muhammad (SAW), others say it is a modern day fight for political dominance [25]. In this research however, examples shall be limited to the conflicts between the two factions after the occupation of Iraq by America. This is because the conflicts escalated most between them after the invasion of the country by America in 2003. Since then, it has become the menu of daily life in Iraq, Sunnis and Shiites killing one another in markets and mosques and holy sites. The level of sectarian violence has grown dangerously close to an all-out civil war [26]. Commenting on the effect of violence between Sunnis and Shiites after United States occupation, a 41 year- old Sunni widow and former teacher who identified herself as Umm Muhammad said: 

There used to be a time when Sunnis and Shiites were living like family. We were married to each other, we all had Sunni friends, we all had Shiites friends. It was all like a balloon that exploded [27]. 

The old widow lived in Husseiniyya, a Shiite district of Baghdad. But after Shiite militias forced all the Sunnis out, she fled to a too-costly, too small place in the overwhelmingly Sunni neighborhood of Sadiya on the western side of the Tigris River.

Sectarianism is another disaster that was brought to Iraq by the war and occupation of Iraq [28]; where you find Shiite militias, Sunni insurgent groups, ad-hoc Sunni self-defense groups and tribes killing one another and forcing countless thousands of Shiites and Sunnis in Baghdad to seek safety among their own kind [29]. In addition, even outside the epicenter of sectarian strike in the central region of the country, Shiite factions battle each other in the south, while Sunni tribes and factions clash in the west. Across Iraq, the criminal gangs that emerged with the collapse of law and order rule patches of turf as mini warlords [30]. Only Allah knows the number of people killed or displaced since the sectarian strife began. The political and sectarian violence in Iraq has therefore disintegrated the peaceful co- existence of the Muslim community in Iraq.

Instances of Asabiyyah in Palestine 

As for the civil and political violence in Palestine, we are restricting our example on the current Fatah-Hamas conflict. This is in view of the fact that the crisis mostly involves Muslims on both sides. 

Tension between the two groups began to rise after the death of the PLO leader Yasser Arafat on November 11^th, 2004. By 2006, the civil crisis between the two groups started and has continued in one form or another, into 2008. Majority of the conflicts between the two main Palestinian parties was mostly confined to Gaza strip where fighting intensified after Hamas won the elections of 2006. On 

December 15^th, 2006, fighting broke out in the West Bank after Palestinian security forces fired on a Hamas rally in Ramallah. At least 20 people were wounded in the clashes that came shortly after Hamas accused Fatah of attempting to assassinate Isma’il Haniya, the Palestinian Prime Minister.[30] In spite of the fact that both the Palestinian President and the Prime Minister are Muslims, and also majority of their followers embrace the same religion, yet they failed to resolve their crisis in accordance with the Islamic injunctions. There were several attempts of ceasefire between the two parties; however, the continuing battle has always broken the peace agreement. One of such ceasefires attempt between the two rival groups took place in the Islamic holy City of Makkah, Saudi Arabia, in February 2007. Yet, minor incidents continued between March and April 2007.

The United States and its Western allies on the other hand were against the democratically elected Hamas government and were determined to sow the seeds of civil war to oust it from power. To this end, the United States supplied guns, ammunition and training to Palestinian Fatah activist to take on Hamas in the streets of Gaza and the west Bank. They spent $59 million in that regard and covertly persuaded Arab allies to supply more funding. Jordan and Egypt complied with US persuasion and trained two Fatah battalions, one of which was deployed to Gaza in May 2007.

Israel on the other hand was also launching its own attack on the Hamas government in the Gaza strip. In half a year, more than 150 Palestinians have been killed in fighting, sparking the fear that a civil war could erupt in the Palestinian authorities, and especially in Gaza. Both Israel and the United States succeeded in kindling the fire of war between Fatah and Hamas. The war, which occurred between 10th and 14th June, left many Palestinians dead and injured. The Hamas fighters throughout the Gaza strip overran several Fatah positions. In other words, within four days of the intense fighting, Hamas defeated Fatah by taking full control of the Gaza city and establishing a separate government. The defeat of the Fatah security forces in the Gaza strip resulted in their reaction against Hamas institutions in west Bank, as their numbers are greater. The dissolution of the Unity Government and the declaration of a state of emergency by President Mahmud Abbas further worsen the situation. The Hamas in practical terms regarded the dismissal of the Prime Minister Isma’il Haniya worthless. Clashes continued to occur between Fatah and Hamas especially in the West Bank. The Hamas leader Mahmud Zahar declared on June 20, 2007 that if Fatah continued to try to uproot Hamas in the West Bank, it could lead to Fatah’s down fall there as well, as the Hamas resistance against Fatah would take the form of attacks and suicide bombings similar to those Hamas has used against Israel in the past.

The crisis between Fatah and Hamas is the fourth and last example cited above to show the kind of Asabiyyah prejudice that is occurring between the two groups. The effects of civil and political violence between them include:

• Hatred, enmity and disunity among the Muslims in Palestine

• Indiscriminate killings of one another just because of political differences

• Muslims from Fatah party get their funds, arms and training from the enemies of Islam to fight against their fellow Muslim brothers from Hamas party

• Each of the rival parties tries to help the members of their group without caring much whether they are right or wrong

• Differences of opinion as regards facing their common enemy, Israel

From the above analysis, it becomes obvious that Asabiyyah prejudices such as ancestral egotism, ethnic disputes, political partisanship, and sectarian violence, etc. are global phenomena that used to cause enmity, hatred and disharmony among the various Muslim groups. Most of these crises were in existence since before the coming of Islam. When Islam came, Asabiyyah was one of the immediate problems faced by the Prophet (SAW) before and after his migration to Madinah. Conflicts as a result of Asabiyyah prejudice also continued to occur after the death of the Prophet (SAW) up to the present period. It is a phenomenon that has become pervasive. Almost every nation has unresolved conflicts of Asabiyyah. The instances of such crises discussed in Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq and Palestine above, justify the fact that Asabiyyah has been a major threat to the unity and peaceful coexistence of the Muslim World since the death of the Prophet (SAW).

1. Khan, M.A. The Pious Caliphs. Great Britain: Diwan Press, pp. 27–28.

2. Abdulkareem, L. “Asabiyyah Prejudice and Its Harmful Effects on Muslim Community.” A paper presented at the 17th International Conference on Arabic and Islamic Studies held in Lisbon, Portugal on 16–17 April 2015 (see International Science Index), eISSN: 1307-6892, p. 665.

3. Rahim, A. Islamic History. Nigeria: Islamic Publication Bureau, Lagos, pp. 93–94, 15, and 162.

4. Zanadiqah: They were a sectarian group who entered the religion of Islam with the intention of destroying it. They regarded Ali (RA) as God. He ordered their killings by fire after they refused to repent.

5. Al-Baghawi, H.M. Mu‘alim al-Tanzil (Tafsir al-Baghawi). Dar al-Tayyibah, 4th ed., 1417/1997, Vol. 3, p. 173. Available at www.qurancomplex.com.

6. Al-Qurtubi, M.A. Al-Jami‘Li Ahkam al-Qur’an. Mawqi‘ Ya’sub, n.d., Vol. 1, p. 78.

7. Raudatul-Muhaddithin, Vol. 7, p. 244.

8. He was the leader of the Shiite and its founder. He falsely embraced Islam in order to disunite the Muslims.

9. Uthman, A.M. Mahabbatur-Rasul Bain al-It‘ba’ Wa al-Ibtida’. Riyadh: Ri’asatu Idarat al-Buhuth al-‘Ilmiyyah Wa al-Ifta’ Wa al-Da‘wah Wa al-Irshad, 1414H, Vol. 1, p. 196.

10. Irvin, T.B. Islam Resurgent: The Islamic World Today. Nigeria: Islamic Publication Bureau, Lagos, p. 144.

11. “Mustafa Kemal Ataturk Was a True Turkish Muslim.” ShiaChat.com, retrieved on August 2012.

12. Naqavi, A.M. Islam and Nationalism. Iran: Islamic Propagation Organisation, Tehran, 1984/1405, p. 12. “Ethnic Studies Report.” International Center for Ethnic Studies, n.d., Vol. XVII, No. 1, p. 1.

13. “Dirty Little Secrets – The Unwelcome Guests.” Available at http://www.strategy.com/dls/default.asp. Retrieved on December 2009, p. 1.

14. “Ethnic Studies Report,” op. cit., p. 14.

15. “Darfur Conflict.” Available at http://en.wikiped ia.org/wiki/darfurconflict. Retrieved on April 2008, p. 1.

16. “The Real Roots of Darfur.” Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200704/darfurclimate. Retrieved on April 2008.

17. “Darfur Conflict: Janjaweed.” Available at http://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/janjaweed. Retrieved on April 2008, p. 1.

18. “War in Darfur.” Available at http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/warindarfur. Retrieved on April 2008.

19. “Janjaweed.” Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Janjaweed. Retrieved on January 2010, p. 1.

20. “Notes on Ethnic Terminology.” Available at http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/notes_on_ethnic_terminology. Retrieved on April 2008, p. 1.

21. “Fur People.” Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Fur_people. Retrieved on January 2010, p. 1.

22. Darfur at the Crossroads. Retrieved on April 2008 from http://www.2mag.org/content/showarticles.cfm?/itemID=6021, p. 2.

23. I.A. Song. “Ethno-Religious Crises and National Dialogue.” New Nigerian Weekly, No. 2866, Saturday 10 July 2004, p. 6.

24. “Shi‘ite, Sunni Split Feeds Iraq Conflict.” Available at http://www.voanews.com/English/archive. Retrieved on April 2008, p. 1.

25. “Religion and Ethics News Weekly: Shia/Sunni Conflicts.” Available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religiona ndethics/week105/. Retrieved on January 2008, p. 1.

26. “Shi‘ite, Sunni Split,” op. cit., p. 1.

27. “Religion and Ethics News Weekly,” op. cit.

28. “The Root: Sectarian Strife in Iraq Imperils Entire Region, Analysts Warn.” Washington Post, Retrieved on March 2008, p. 1.

29. “Foreign Policy in Focus: Iraq’s Hidden Conflict.” Available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5078. Retrieved on January 2008, p. 1.

30. “Fatah–Hamas Conflict.” Available at http://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/palestenianfactionalviolence. Retrieved on March 2008, p. 2.