Since gained its independence in the mid of 1950s, Sudan has experienced waves of political turmoil and insecurity, often have shaped by civil conflicts and governance volatility, hence, ethnic diversity, lack of the rule of law and regional variation were the reasons behind ubiquity of violent conflicts raged in many parts of the country. Of late and following its commercial discovery in the late of 1990s, oil becomes play a central role in the politics of Sudan, moreover, replaces historic- contested issues (mainly regional, ethnic and cultural variation) that had long led to political disarray among the Sudanese, or may combines these issues through meeting points of direct contact to hinder political security and development. Basically, in the country and during the Salivation’s regime era, over the last three decades (1990-2019) the government’s neglecting and spending, distribution’s policies of oil rent were always used on security apparatus and building client-networks, all of these were steps to dominate authoritarian –one party regime system in Sudan, often had led by National Congress Party (NCP) developed out of military coup in1989.Thus, in this paper the researchers aim to investigate three main objectives to address oil rent, political corruption and regime type relationship and to accomplish its goals. First off, the paper attempts to inspect the relationship between oil rent distributing, spending policies, regime’s system and its allied patronage-networks in Sudan. Second, it examines how spending of oil rent in proactive manner to bay off establishing Patronage- network had strengthened, prolonged NCP regime, developed autocratic- dictatorship governance model and threaten fragile peace also violated human right. Lastly, it symbolizes an effective governance model for optimal distribution policy governing oil sector during the interim period and future Sudan. This paper shall probably be able to close the visible academic gap, by expanding debate and deepening understanding on such issue.

This paper uses a qualitative research method mainly interpretative content technique, type of gather and analyze data, the gathered data largely are supplied from both primary and secondary sources, these including governmental, non-governmental documents and published reports, books and professional articles …etc. such data is closely relevant to oil wealth issue which largely involves companies, organizations and institutions concerns. A total of 15 individuals were interviewed by the authors using open- ended form of interview. These interviews conducted to interrogate the informants were related to oil wealth and governance, management topics for the purpose of verifying gathered data through triangulation process. For the data analysis, the authors used content-direction analysis technique. Thus, in terms of interviews, an interpretive method is used after being contented, refined, coded, triangulated, categorized and then further data may be familiarized, interpreted in explanatory way to determine oil rent, political corruption and governance type nexus. However, focusing on the preferred period (1999-2019), is critical to place rentier-authoritarian regime type, sever corruption and insecurity relationship into play in Sudan political realm.

Literature Review

Literature on rent are largely examining the manner of oil-rich states in distributing and spending revenue that come from the mining sector among their citizens. According to Losman’s definition [1], a rentier state refers to a country that gathers a substantial portion of its income from external sources, generally, mostly from the sales of resources such as oil and gas. Rentier states therefore, enjoy a degree of autonomy form society due to natural resources abundance and do not heavily rely on its citizens in the collection of revenue such as taxing [2]. The discussion in lines bellow will focus on the way in which rent influences state capacity, governance type and political elite behavior and distribution mechanism of oil revenue, practically Sudan which is the focus in this paper shows that the country is likely becoming a rentier state that heavily relies on oil rent. On the relationship between resources revenue and state capacity, some literature make a link between rent, poor institutions, inadequate policies and mal-distribution of resource revenue , for example, Zeynalov [3], Couttenier and Soubeyran [4] and Lohote [5], have suggest that mineral resources abundance and influx of external rents generated from these resources hinder institutional, democratic development and economic growth; and thus, cause uneven distribution of public revenue and encourage civil conflicts in resources –rich counties as well. Likewise, Lundahl and Sjohӧlm [6], state that countries those rely on rent from minerals such as oil tend to have a more corruption, unequal income distribution and poor institutions and these poor institutions, mal-distribution on income explain almost of the weak performance of rentier state. De Soya and Neumayer [7] and Schwarz [2], summarize that rent has multiple effects on country that depends on mineral revenue and such effect directly influence economic, governance effectiveness and socioeconomic development. Gadkarim [8], specifies that in Sudan, state –centered oil management, high dependence on oil revenue, weak governance and lack of economic diversification, decline economy and growth in other production sectors also have greater stakes of conflict. A review of the preceding literature developed a reasonable opinion regarding the relationship between mineral revenue, weak state, institutions and development. However, rent generated from mineral resources can lead to state fragility, weak governance system and lack of institution capacity, when a state greatly relies on external revenue and overlooks other sectors that can also contribute to the generation of the wealth, such as industrial and agricultural sectors. This situation presents the main reason behind the resource endowment difficulties and one of them is the Dutch disease.

Alternatively, type of regime, legitimacy, degree of institutionalization and transparency are critical features to determine a distributive capacity of rentier state. In this topic, Mahler [9], clarifies that a rentier state is typically characterized as authoritarian, weak institutions and stat capacity as well as economically inefficient. According to Alao [10] and Koning [11], the control of rent by central bureaucracies, weak institutions and lack of transparency are inherited from totalitarian regimes and political corruption in oil-rich countries worldwide. In interesting way, some literature link between political corruption, establish patronage networks and use rent from minerals, as Gervasoni [12], notes that, “rents allow officials to buy support and build patronage networks, which in turn stunt the development of available opposition and related democratic institutions”. In most oil-rich countries, political elites use the rent of mineral to establish patronage network to gain personal benefits and defend their interests instead of spending them on services and development of a state [13]. In this way, different selective distributive policies have been adopted in oil –rich countries. For example, Beck [14] and Gengler [15], state that in middle east and Arab counties, politicians control rent using segmentation and co-opting policies through paying off to recruit opposition and social leaders in order to sustain their autocracy regime and avoid democratic opposition. Moreover, some countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Bahrain and Oman employ religion and tribes to establish patronage network supported by oil revenue [16]. This also can be experienced from Latin America and Africa’s political aspect. For example Bssedau and Lacher [17], cites that, in west Africa region, specially, in the Gabon; oil money fuels networks of patronage, providing political support for president Omer Bongo, who ruled the country since 1967. Moreover, basis on his empirical study of 26 African countries, Omgba [18], concludes:

The first empirical result of this study is that; oil has a stabilizing effect on African leaders…. Thus, in oil African countries, oil rents undermine electoral competition by allowing corruption… in this way; the democratization process fails to bring real change in the top of executive.

Review of the literature on the relationship between rent, government’s nature and spending in oil –countries, demonstrates the way in which political elites of these countries using the revenue generated from. They agreed that rent from oil is largely used to establish client- networks which support and protect elite’s power, since totalitarian nature of a regime system, centralized management of mineral revenue and pay off by rulers to those who challenge are key factors that cause government deficiency and political disorder in oil-rich countries, Table 1 displays types of government disruptive policies under authoritarian regimes, which aim to bring stability and security in rentier states.

Table 1: Government Strategies to Maintain Political Stability using Oil Revenue

Source: Baseedau and Lacher [17]

From the Table 1, the distributive policies adopted by the political leaders in oil countries to maintain stability are usually on large spending equipment, on security e, using various means equipment, or co-opting likely opposition and therefore, using various means which include singular use of power, limit political oppositions and accountability, pay off the oppositions ad establish a patronage network in order to get legacy. Purposely and for expanding debate and deepening understanding on the relationship between oil rent, regime system and fragility of peace and security in Sudan, the present paper tends to display how the relationship between oil rent, regime system and patronage networks hamper sustainable peace, democratic transformation and form autocratic regime system as well as violate human right of the Sudanese, during the (Ingāz) regime (1989-2019).

Background

Sudan is a vast country in terms of people, land, covers an area approximately nearly 1.881.000 km² and is located in the north-east part of Africa [19]. It gained its independence in 1956 from Britain [20]. Before the popular revolution of 2019, Sudan has experienced different type of governance and ruling system ranging between unitary, regional and federal system. Moreover, civil, military and one party regime, all of these have been experienced too. However, the authoritarian regime is dominated through its independence age (During the short-lived period as an independent country; Sudan has witnessed three eras of Military-one party regime system through (i.e. 1958-1964; 1969-1985 and 1989-2019)). Presently and following the revolution withdrew dominated one party system of NCP, Sudan lives a transitional period, governs by civilian-military transitional government. In terms of natural wealth, the country embodies plenty of natural resources, besides a vast agricultural pastoral land, Sudan is rich in mineral resources including gold, uranium, iron, copper and oil [21]. Even though Sudan’s resources are abundant, resource management and development process in the country always reveal unfulfilled secured and advantage to its people, in terms of alleviating poverty and regional equality. Concerning its political security and stability, the country experienced a history civil conflicts that was launched first in south part in 1955, which had ended following secession of the region in 2011. So far the conflict has split into west, east and south east and has brutally continue during 2003-2019. Elements of weak state, military- centralized nature of regime, ethnic and historical grievance as well as regional disparities are among the reasons for the great state of instability in the country at large [22]. Of late and through the last three decades, the role of oil wealth has become visible as source of political insecurity and supremacy of autocratic regime system, as issue of equitable allocation of power over oil and its rent grows critical among the Sudanese. However, since the past control on oil wealth in Sudan remains a sole right to center and its elites without sharing majority of Sudanese and regions, this for so long has been enforced by several laws constitutional and decrees these included for the example Constitution of 1998 [23] and Oil Wealth Act [24]. All of them have validated centre authority over oil sector without any exemption. In fact, oil has become a central element of Sudan’s politics, conflict and economic condition in the country following its first discovery in the late 1970s and its commercial production in 1997 [25,26] by Asian non- traditional companies been active in Sudan’s oil industry (The withdrawal of major western oil companies were active in Sudan oil (i.e. Ajip, Chevron, Total, Talisman…etc), shortly after the military government came to power in 1989 and deterioration of relationship between USA , Sudan and Human rights organizations, provided an opportunity for a growing oil companies to be active in Sudan’s Oil industry, mainly China National petroleum Company CNPC, Petronas of Malaysia Oil and Natural Gas Company ONGC of India) [27,28]). Primarily, the development of oil discoveries had sparked, reinforced regional sentiment among the Sudanese and characterized politician behavior as well as aggravated the ended conflict between north and so south Sudan (currently Republic of the South Sudan) (Though, the civil war between north and south Sudan was launched pre-date the period of oil exploration and production from 1950s to 1990s and caused by several dispute over political power , cultural identity and natural resources the discovery of oil along the traditional north –south border, greatly raised the stakes in the historic conflict). 

In attempt to settle dispute over natural wealth, particularly oil in Sudan, a number of peace agreements were signed during 2005-2006 (i.e. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Darfur Peace Agreement and East Sudan Peace Agreement), between the central government and rebel groups of South, Darfur and East regions) (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Singed between the Sudan’s Government and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army SPLM/A, a former Southern Rebel group in Naivasha, Kenya, 9th January 2005. Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), Singed between the Sudan’s Government and Faction of the insurgent Sudan Liberation Army SLA, in Abuja, Nigeria, on 5 May 2006. East Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), singed between the Sudan’s government and eastern front (Beja Congress and Rashida Free Lions), in Asmara, Eretria, on 16 October 2006). The peace partners agreed equitable allocation of resource, wealth and balanced development in all Sudan. However, peace was fragile and shortly collapsed and dispute over mineral revenue, ownership and totalitarian regime system are continuing without lasting solution. To pursue the December/19/2019 Revolution’s aspires, a number of insurgent groups and the transitional government singed the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020, aiming lasting peace, democratic transformation and resource security. The present paper endeavors to demonstrate how the government during the NCP regime employed opposing, tribal- religious leaders and security forces as well as public- private companies to establish patronage networks supported by oil rent, a matter originated political corruption, insecurity and dominate autocratic regime system in Sudan.

Political Implications of Oil Rent in the Politics of Sudan

Since its independence, Sudan has seen several cycles of democratic-parliament rule, military coup and revolution (1964-1985 -2019), governing with different thought and ideologies and Sudanese believes, hence, the Sudanese culture, tribal structure and religious-sectarian were the sources of regime and governance system and ecumenically donated with small industries, agricultural- pastoral types of national wealth, all of these are often characterized the nature-structure of Sudan’s regime, political system prior oil period. Truly, oil has become a vital element of Sudan’s politics and economic condition in the period following its first commercial production and export in 1999 and the country severely turn into a rentier state. However, once commercial production finally started in 1997and exports begun extensively in 1997, after the completion of pipeline of nearly 1.600 km by CNPC to port Sudan in the red sea ([25], Sudan has become a major African oil producer, with production capacity averaging 480,000bpd in 2008 [26]. Reserves stood at 5 billion and 6.7 million in early 2009, making Sudan the fifth largest oil producer on the continent, though its reserves are considerably smaller than those of Nigeria and Angola [27]). All of Sudan’s oil exports- about 394.000bpd in 2008 are going to Asia, 54% of them to china and 26% to Japan [28]. The oil’s export accounted 95% of Sudan’s exports and 60% of government revenue made the country’s economy be held hostage to the oil market [29].

Alternatively, advent of oil in 1999 led to major transition and growth in Sudan’s economy, to a destabilizing degree. The size of the Sudan’s nominal Growth National Product (GDP) grew fivefold from $10 billion in 1999 to $55 billion in 2008 [30]. Living standard of the Sudanese people is improved as well. “Since per capita income; a summary measure of the living standard of average citizens has increased from$334 to $532 compared to$ 200-300 in the pre- oil period” [31]. The government’s aggregated revenues in the 2008 central budget is optimistically increased to (24,707.9) higher than (18,462.9) in 2007 [32]. The Sudan’s economy has also become more integrated with the rest of the world. Its foreign trade to GDP ratio has increased from 25% in 2000 to 44% in 2008 [31]. Though, improvement in these economic areas, the Sudanese economy is under threat. The economic threats come from the economy’s over-reliance on only oil as the main source of growth and discourage the non-oil sectors, especially the agriculture, services and labor market sectors. The agriculture sector declined from half GDP in 2009 to about 31% in 2010 [33]. Also, the rate of unemployment increased by 3.4% from 16.6% in 1999 to 20.0% in 2009 [31]. Moreover, oil has not played a positive role in the poverty alleviation and social services development. According to the African Development Bank Group [35], “there are 36.1% of Sudan’s population living below the global poverty line and 25% of Sudan’s population living below extreme poverty line”. 

In this context, oil which greatly contributed in a degree of economic growth, heavily reliance on it as source of wealth and thus form a new type of governance and state, deteriorated other economic sectors, raised stakes in political instability, insecurity and governance performance, however, the government’s tendency to strength its control over mineral wealth, standing long in power and win legitimacy created a type of autocratic –corrupted regime system employed oil rent to pay-off on its own security and establishing client-network , neglecting major of Sudanese from oil rent. This well is detailed below.

Oil Wealth, Security Military Spending and Regime’s Patronage Networks

Experience from revenue sharing that generated from oil resource between the central government and entire regions and people in Sudan, illustrated that, besides centralized nature of the regime’s system, weak institutions and laws related to oil revenue spending and sharing between the center the, regions and people. Corruption has greatly affected the efficiency of oil resource management and optimal allocation of its rent. The country is considered a very corrupt one. It ranked 174 out of 176 on international corruption perception index 2012 and comes into the bottom 4.3% of countries in the World Bank’s control of corruption [36]. The scale of corruption has been further magnified since the late of 1990s by the growth of the oil industry. The corruption is believed to have spread into the NCP, the ex- dominate party during oil production and exploitation period in Sudan. Sound of the lack of transparency and accountability is responsible for heightening the scale of corruption in the country, however, power and wealth remained concentrated in hands of few people those close to the ruling party and the rest of Sudanese are neglected and impoverished. The most common corruption being the spending oil rent on military, security apparatus, establishment of the government’s patronage networks and pay-off the likely oppositions for strengthening the current regime in power and embezzlement of public fund. 

In this view, corruption has explicated the ways in which the government has been spending the oil rent. Indeed, the government used the oil money to spend generously on military, security apparatus to finance conflict against rebel groups and secure the regime rather than spend on development and sustain peace in Sudan. The government military spending rose visibly as its oil revenue increased since 1990s. “The government’s oil revenue shot up from a mere 7.64 percent of total revenue in 1999 to 40.45 percent in 2001, during the same period, government’s military expenditure as share of oil revenue rose 27.4 percent to 60.25 percent” [37]. After the outbreak of war in Darfur region in 2003 and particularly during 2004-2009, the government’s military spending rose significantly. “It estimated to be $10 billion ($1.7 billion per year) directed to war effort in the region, while the government has spent only 1.3 % and 1.2 % of its budget on public health, education respectively for more than two decades” [38]. The high military spending, however, did not seem to help the central government to weaken rebels in the country, conflict continued in many parts of Sudan, mainly south, west and east, due to continued unrest over power and wealth between the central government and rebels in these marginalized areas. Thus, the government adopted other co-opting likely opposition means using the oil revenue to pay –off the opposition and establish a patronage network in order to gain legitimacy and stay long in power. Payoff to maintain the government power, had led to the emergence of both corrupts capitalists’ class and regime supportive networks. All of them were individuals and agencies close to ruling party or official’s relatives. Such corrupt networks are joined both clients and key institutions. This included mining and telecommunication companies (e.g., Basher, Heglig oil companies & Sudatel), security sectors (police, intelligence & army) and political elite and foreign financial institutions (e.g., Islamic Bank) [39] and also tribal chiefs from productive and war zone areas mainly those of west, south west and east regions. In fact corruption provided the government’s companies in oil, telecommunication and industrial complex as well as defense sectors an access to acquire assets form public sectors, particularly, those which are sourced of oil. Moreover, allow them to operate independently without being linked to the system of public finance and budget, usually use the states’ assets, oil revenue in their own business. According to Auditor’s general report 2005, an amount, an amount equivalent to nearly $ 65 billion of oil revenue was transferred to ministry of defense and Giad (Jiāād) industrial complex, besides a percentage that equals 5% (%41.874) form oil revenue was deducted as a commission to Sudanese oil operation. All of this money was transferred to these institutions without being audited or included in 2005 budget [39]. Corruption among the ex- ruling party and officials is also found in the sale of the state assets such as land. However, corruption provided the regime cronies to sale state assets and land, so as to acquire capitalist schemes in agricultural sector to private capital [40]. Yet, while oil revenue is already controlled by small group and there is already lack of accountability, anti- corruption efforts and rule of law, the corrupt regime and its networks get on with business of spending oil revenue, embezzle public fund without questions being asked, this resulted in empowering the ruling party and its elites to stay long in power. Meanwhile majority of Sudanese are left in poverty and deprived of the wealth.

Oil, Human Rights Violation and Corporations Corruption in Sudan

Basically, issue of human rights violation and insecurity linkage, search and operation of oil in Sudan have helped fuel conflict and forced massive human rights abuse. Several migration and dislocation of people in productive areas in south east regions have occurred since oil operation launched in the 1990s, figures accounted that “more than 4.5 million Sudanese, mostly indigenous, have been internally displaced” [41]. Both the government and operating companies Talisman of Canada, Petro China (owned by the Chinese government) and Lundin Oil of Sweden were criticized by many human rights organizations for their involvement in Sudan oil industry. Also, the Sudanese government frequently has been accused for its human rights violation as has used money from oil to bolster its military army and security apparatus. As the Human Rights First [42]:

Susan’s military expenditures have risen dramatically since 1997, the year of its first oil export. Much of the money for this shopping spree for weapons came from profits made from oil exports to china. And much of the money has gone directly back to china, for purchases of small arms and other military equipment by Sudan. Sudan’s purchases of small arms, small arm parts and ammunition have risen dramatically since 1999. By 2005, Sudan’s small arms imports had risen to more than 680 times their 1999 levels.

The government in turn, used these arms to secure oil regions (south and west areas) by driving off tens of thousands of their residents [43]. Moreover, it used these arms to defend itself against rebels and civil oppositions. “The government has used the roads, bridges and airfields built by the oil companies as means for it to launch attacks on civilians in southern- western regions [44]. This provided evidences of the complicity of oil companies such as Talisman, Lundin and Petro China in the human rights violation in Sudan. However, these companies’ plaintiffs accused that it “turned a blind eye to well –reported government attacks on civilian targets, including aerial bombing of hospitals, churches, Relief operations and school” [45]. Apparently, the Sudanese government has carried out serious human rights violations including dislocation, scorched earth policies, suppression of rebels, alternatively, the corporations have been accused of facilitating and supplying financial and logistical supports to the government to resume oil production. This explains the complex relationship between oil and human right abuse. Moreover, explains the complicity of oil companies in the Sudanese’s civil conflicts. The same to corporations’ failure in compensation local people for using their land for oil production, complicity of corporations in human right abuse disclose ineffective efforts made by them to recover poor situations in their concession and the country at large. Furthermore, to some extent these companies CNPC in particular, are responsible for prolonging the state if conflict in the country (i.e., war in Darfur and Nuba Mountains), “since their excretive activities provided funding for arms or providing arms directly to the government, the case of the Chinese’s heavy investment in Sudan’s oil sector and continue supplying the Sudanese government with arms is close example” [46]. 

Within the country, in addition to the complicity of corporations in human rights abuse, the relationship between the corporations and corruption that contributed to fuel political unrest in Sudan is also focus to recent examination. In many countries, including Sudan, corruption sourced conflicts are due to its role in hindering development, increasing poverty, creating socioeconomic conditions in addition to deficiency on delivering of basic services to one community. Essentially, “Lack to the rule of law and lack of transparency, accountability is often considered as the most elements that are source sever corruption into government and foreign, private agencies” [46]. In the case of Sudan, the country is a very corrupt one with fragile environment to doing business or favorable to foreign, private sector involvement. “It scored only 0.9 in political stability, 6.2 in rule of law, 7.2 in regulatory quality in government effectiveness and 4.3 in control corruption [47], this state makes it difficult to conduct business and achieving social and economic development and political stability in Sudan [48] (Table 2).

Table 2: Measure of Corruption and Business Environment in Sudan

Source: KMPG [49]

In consequence, experience from Sudan indicated that the involvement of the corporation in country’s oil sector worsen the situation, since the oil sector is highly vulnerable to corruption actions, such as bribing public officials and inappropriately influencing the legislative process [48]. What makes things worse is that “the Sudanese does not provide criminal penalties for official corruption and officials frequently engage in corrupt practices. The government does not investigate officials suspected of corruption and government officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws [49]. Hence, lack to transparency and access to the government information and figures, particularly related to oil have operated corruption in different levels of the oil sector. At the corporations’ level, corruption is also found. The CNPC a major operator of Sudan’s oil sector, for example, forced sever corruption criticism for its oil activities in Sudan. The company scored below in terms of disclosure of anti-corruption initiative, financial information and payment. Also it does not publicly disclose anti-corruption audits of its departments and subsidiaries, or data about employee anti-corruption trainings [48]. Lack of official’s figures, audits and anti-corruption efforts, made the company more vulnerable to the corruption risks. “this in turn worsens income distribution, takes resources for development and social welfare programs and represents illegal privatization of national revenue” [50]. Yet, the relationship between corrupt business and unsuccessful implementation of community development is existed.

In the area of conflict and sustain peace in Sudan, though oil played positive role in putting an end to the Sudan’s second civil war (1983-2005) and agreed fifty share in the oil revenue between north and South Sudan, however, a very little transparency and accountability in the oil sector risked the fragile peace of 2005. Such lack of transparency greatly raised the suspicious over the sharing of oil revenue between NCP and SPLM and weather the oil revenue sharing implanted fairly between north and South Sudan during the peace time. Many of the issues related to oil industry were not publicized, in this focus “the arrangement between the Sudanese government and companies on production is not independently verified” [51]. Moreover, the accounting for the funds received by the government of southern Sudan or from oil revenue, or donor aid for that matter, is not public [52]. An additional problem that caused mistrust between the government and southerners is the oil production facts. According to the Global Witness [53] that: “The government’s oil production figures were smaller than company’s by between 9% and 26%, rising the suspicious that the government under-declares the volume of oil produced and therefore shares less oil revenues with the south than specified by the peace agreement”. There was also a question of mistrust over real revenue from oil exports and sales. As Bushire [54]: confirmed that (Table 3,4):

Table 3: Comparison of Price of oil (Dar blend) prices as quoted by the oil Industry Press and Ministry of Finance

Source: adopted from the Global Witness [53]

Table 4: Comparison of Pipelines fees as Quoted by the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Sudan

Source: The Global Witness [53]

Since the oil‘s first export in 1999, always there was a suspicious among the Sudanese over real revenues that generated from oil exports and sales. Figures released in the government’s budget and real revenues were at discrepancy. For example, in 2004-2005 the volume of oil profits that the government reported in its budgets were $1.8 and $2.3 million less $1.3 and $1.9 million than real revenue from crude oil export which accounted $ 3.1 and $4.2 in the same years.

In short, corruption is a severe problem in Sudan, operated in the government institutions and foreign corporation’s alike. The corrupt environment in the country encouraged the regime system to practice some forms of corruption, the government official’s figures, account, income from oil resource often are not publicized. However, lack of access to information, rule of law and transparency, provided the government an opportunity to be free of accountability and responsibility for providing the local people real needs, in terms of engaging in large development, social welfare projects and sustain peace, which may support curbing of resource, economic related conflicts and thus created authoritarian regime system, fueled insecurity and political unrest, these in turn persuade Sudanese to eradicate the corrupted – regime system. Figure bellow shows the relationship rentier regime system, distribution policy and instability. 

Form Figure 1, it appears that brining stability and peace in Sudan, would require democratic reform, large scale distributive polices regarding equitable distribution of oil rent among the Sudanese, balance development and poverty alleviation and sharing power between the center and regions, as precondition to stability and security instead of spending it on security apparatus and pay-off establishment of patronage Networks. Processes reform and approach to towards political stability will be detailed in papers bellow.

Figure 1: Regime Type and Distribution Policy

Source: Created by the Researchers

Democratic–Devolution Reform: An Approach for Good Governance and Restore Security in Sudan

One continuing source of political insecurity, tension between central government and entire regions, people and governance deficiency is an authoritarian-corrupted nature of the regime system in Sudan. The country has faced major problems of revenue allocation and corruption, resources revenue particularly those that generated from oil were not thoroughly governed and maneuvered towards feeding into development to reduce regional disparities and poverty. Over the past three decades, oil revenue provided the government with billions of dollars, instead of spending these dollars on productive projects, utilize Sudan’s huge natural resources for sustainable development, it was spent generously on military and security expenditures [55]. Today, poverty is augmented in the country. Over 35% of Sudan’s population lives under poverty line and the country is characterized by sever corruption and very poor state legitimacy [56]. The inevitable result of this state of affairs is poor the poor management and distribution of oil rent. This in turn led to establishment of autocratic – rentier regime system and frustration among the regions and people of Sudan. Such situation will definitely cause a surge in violence and instability along with a potential change in the governing system aimed at building of new type of regime system and adequate formula to allocate oil rent between the central government, regions and people of Sudan, as we will symbolize bellow.

Experience form Sudan, shows that issues of minerals resource governance (e.g. oil) and power over are considered to be major challenges to political, governance efficiency and political security and this because the resolution of this issues remains to be an essential task for governance reform and lasting peace. “And this requires several political, institutional process targeting state building, political integration and stability” [57]. Since non-democratic nature of (Ingāz) regime, lack of capacity at lower levels over of governance and failure on addressing issue of fair allocation of oil revenue between the center and regions, had resulted in centralized-totalitarian nature of the regime and risked the new porn federal system of 1990s in Sudan. Thus, political devolution, good governance and balance of power between the different tires of government are preconditions for equitable allocation of power and mineral wetly between the central government, regions and Sudan. In this view, a serious devolution can be recognized as starting point towards a genuine political reform and democratic transformation in the country, which in turn develops public participation, governance efficiency and combating corruption also secures fair, integrated management of oil revenue. Therefore, “the transformation from totalitarian, centralized system to democratic- consensual, institutionalized governance is considered to be the foundation to the way of cooperative governance of oil wealth and its distribution” [58]. Thus, the provision of power between national and lower orders is dynamic key to achieve this. Recently, in Sudan, Tendency to democracy is the function towards real devolution and good governance, which develop oil sector and alleviate concentration of mineral wealth, oil revenue in particular. Likewise, transformation from totalitarian –centric to democratic- devolution regime can also be considered as an initiative towards good governance and development of broad participation ay national and local levels alike, since good governance is considered as an institutionalized framework that constitutes of policy makers and acting institutions, implied governmental, private and non-governmental organizations [59]. Furthermore, good governance efficiency and security, “it focuses on sustaining local governance and human security for individual and groups alike, fairness on distribution of available resources, capacity building, political freedom and participation on decision making [60]. It should be noted that the principles of good governance (e.g., rule of law, transparency and accountability) and objectives of devolution are compatible and complement each other. For that reason, ideally the application of devolution on oil sector management in Sudan should vary in accordance to some factors such as responsive, real participation, accountability and transparency. These factors are demonstrated in resource security (e.g. oil sector) as follows:

• Contribution of lower orders in policy and decision-making regarding oil revenue management will develop a sense of equality and responsibility of local people; and participation mineral resources governance and usage will encourage local peoples to be involved in economic growth and increase revenue at both local and national levels

• It provides better response capability and significantly empowers or assigns a degree of power to locally elected officials. This is because these leaders are close to the local people and are their of their needs and problems, more than their counterparts at the center

• It provides an adequate fund to enable the effectiveness of government tiers mainly at lower levels, through allocation from national revenues on the basis of a formula, this in turn makes efficiency possible

• It imposes the accountability rules on all key players at all levels of governance, for the purpose of correcting inaccuracies and questioning the persons involved, thereby, creating some control over governor’s political power

• Ensures transparency in national and local accounts, particularly in oil revenue, through annual-budget report, in order to identify total revenue, expenditure and transfers to lower orders

From the Figure 2, the empowerment of democratic transformation and good governance are seen as likely means of securing successful implementation of a devolution system in Sudan, since the democratic –good governance is competent to ensure distribution of power, enhances institutions capacity , as within the country; they are always challenges risking its political stability due to poor institutions and dispute over the allocated power and wealth between the national government and lower levels. Therefore, reforming and increasing the capacity of institutions at all levels of government are needed. In addition to legislative reforms, key factors to develop the devolution and create integrated institutions of mineral resources are also be considered; this process may support the reform of regime system, mitigation of resource conflict and brining stability, security in the country.

Figure: 2: Democratic –Devolution Framework for Regime System & Oil Rent Governance

Source: Created by the Researchers

In Sudan, corruption relates governing, utilizing and distribution of oil rent, created type of totalitarian -one party regime system and has greatly affected the competence of oil resource management and optimal allocation its revenue. Yet, much of oil revenue were using by government to pay-off establishment of patronage–networks, repression likely opposition and military apparatus, for its own security supremacy and thus, neglecting major of the Sudanese, left them in poor and marginalization, resulted in governance deficiency, fragile peace and mal-development and also human rights violation. Currently and once overthrew of the NCP regime system and initiated of interim-transitional period and government, political reform that draws from democratic transformation and establishment of good governance is essential in reaching oil resource management. However, the provisions of constitutional and institutional reforms remain the key factors in empowering the distribution of power and oil rent between the centre and regions following the founding of devolution system. In addition political reform drawing from devolution and good governance integrates oil resource, revenue’s governance and political reform as prerequisites in eradicating rentier –authorized regime type of governance, solving regional disparities and putting an end to the dispute over mineral resources (especially oil) between the center and regions and thus, bring restore political stability and security in Sudan.

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